MUSEUMS AS SITES OF HISTORICAL PROPAGANDA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MUSEUM-BUILDING PRACTICES UNDER THE STALINIST AND PUTINIST REGIMES IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

The preservation of cultural heritage, the actualisation of the past, and the reconstruction of selected historical episodes are the functions of museums that make them vital sites of memory, shaping collective memory and disseminating it among the population. At the same time, political regimes frequently instrumentalise memory, influencing museum institutions through official memory politics. This tendency is particularly evident in dictatorial regimes, where ideology replaces history, and propaganda and historical narratives merge into a single one. In this case, museums are transformed from “sites of memory” into “sites of propaganda” (Porzgen, 2017, p. 419).

During the Soviet era, museums were an integral part of the propaganda apparatus. In the reports of the propaganda and agitation departments, a separate section was always allocated to museums, emphasising the adherence to ideological goals, changes in excursion activities, major ideological events, and their coverage by the population (Yakubets′, 2016; Man′kovs′ka, 2017; Drozdov, 2022). In contemporary Putin’s Russia, the state promotes historical propaganda through museums, employing them as ideological weapons during military aggression (Mostovshikov, 2025, p. 14).

In occupied territories, dictatorial regimes, including the Stalinist and Putinist, employed not only a politics of organised forgetting but also the systematic construction of an official version of the past. Political myths and corresponding historical propaganda narratives aimed to replace national and local memories with a new grand narrative that aligned with the official ideology. In this context, museums served as one of the primary instruments of this politics. Considering the necessity of rapid indoctrination into a new interpretation of history, these regimes actively influence changes in the exhibitions of existing museums and create new “museum institutions” that were, in fact, mouthpieces of propaganda rather than sites for preserving memory.

The author conducts a historical comparison of the museum-building approaches of the Stalinist and Putinist regimes in the occupied territories. The analysis is based on Soviet museums established in the annexed Ukrainian territories in 1945–53 and new museums in Russian-occupied cities in southern and eastern Ukraine in 2022–25. The article has been prepared within the framework of the research project “Museum Heritage of Ukraine under Occupation: Historical Parallels Between Stalinist and Putinist Memory Politics.”

The Soviet museum network in the occupied Ukrainian territories (Western Ukraine, Northern Bukovyna, Southern Bessarabia, and Transcarpathia) was established during the late Stalinism (1945–53) as an integral part of the all-Union system. Depending on their status, museums held either republican or local significance and were categorised into historical, local lore, literary-memorial, and art profiles. By 1950, there were two historical, fourteen local lore, six literary, and five art museums operating in the annexed territories (TsDAHOU, f. 1, inv. 70, file 1973, pp. 33–41). Each region had a local lore museum, whose exhibitions reflected the dominant historical narrative of the “liberation” and “reunification” of Ukrainian lands. Lviv differed from other cities in that, due to its cultural and historical importance, it had five museums (before 1939, there were 26). Most museums were established from the collections of former institutions that functioned in the interwar period. However, new ones were also established with a clear ideological purpose, such as the Lviv branch of the Central Museum of V.I. Lenin, opened in the very centre of the city in 1950. In addition, since the Stalinist regime promoted the concept of “reunification of the Ukrainian people,” the establishment of museums dedicated to prominent cultural figures (Ivan Franko, Ol′ha Kobylians′ka, Lesia Ukrainka, and others) became a characteristic feature in museum building.

Ideological pressure on museum institutions intensified in 1949, following the adoption of the resolution “On the State and Measures for Improving the Work of Museums,” which identified shortcomings in museum operations, particularly the underuse of collections in communist education for workers. The main shortcoming was the lack of comprehensive exhibitions on the history of the Ukrainian people in the second half of the 19th and 20th centuries, which were supposed to reflect “the struggle of the working people for the communist society building” and for “their social and national liberation,” “the unity of origin and historical commonality of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples, the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, the leading role of the great Russian people in the family of peoples of the Soviet Union, the role of Lenin-Stalin and the Bolshevik Party in the struggle of the Ukrainian people for Soviet power, for the victory of communism” (TsDAVOVU, f. 4762, inv. 1, file 286, pp. 105–106).

Unlike Stalin’s national policy, which sought to transform Ukrainians into a submissive “socialist people” grateful to the Russian people for their “liberation” and “reunification,” Putin’s doctrine denies the subjectivity of the Ukrainian nation, reproducing the imperial-era narratives about the historical commonality of “brotherly peoples.” The current Russian museum policy, as a component of the politics of memory, aims to promote official ideology and shape a new identity (Mostovshikov, 2025, p. 14). It seeks to inscribe the history of the occupied territories into a single Russian grand narrative, to distort Ukrainian history and to present the independent Ukrainian state as a temporary quasi-state entity that emerged after the “geopolitical catastrophe” of the USSR’s collapse. Drawing on Soviet practices, it propagates the image of Russia as a “liberator” and replaces authentic Ukrainian exhibitions with mythical narratives of “shared history” (Shkorubs′ka, 2025, p. 453).

As in Stalin’s period, Putin’s Russia is actively developing a museum network in the occupied territories and investing considerably more resources in it. During the late Stalinist period, cultural development was constrained by limited funding due to postwar reconstruction efforts. In the Russian case, despite the enormous economic costs of waging an intensive war, there is a significant initiative known as “special building” (spetsstroitel′stvo), which entails the establishment of large-scale cultural centres in the occupied territories (Kotubey-Geruts′ka, 2024). Such a building is carried out by the Military Construction Complex of the Russian Ministry of Defence, which, in particular, built in six months the multimedia historical park Russia – My History in Melitopol, part of an extensive centralised museum network comprising 25 parks. The purpose of this historical-propagandistic network is to glorify Russian history among the population and heroise Russian invaders. The vast complex, which covers nearly 6,000 square metres, contains 11 permanent and temporary exhibitions, based on four main exhibitions: “The Rurikids, 862–1598,” “The Romanovs, 1613–1917,” “1914–1945: From Great Upheavals to the Great Victory,” and “Russia – My History: 1945 – Present Day” (Nosok, 2025). In addition, among the newly constructed museums, it is worth highlighting those that justify the so-called “SVO” (“special military operation”) and those dedicated to individuals who play an important role in Russian historical and propaganda discourse.

A common feature of museum practices under the Stalinist and Putinist regimes is the glorification of the “Great Patriotic War,” which serves as a central pillar of both ideological frameworks. In the Western Ukrainian territories, no specialised museums dedicated exclusively to the “Great Patriotic War” were established. However, this theme was a mandatory component of any local lore museum exhibition. The structure of such an exhibition was typical and included both materials about the general actions of the Soviet army and the partisan movement, as well as local materials. For example, in the 1951 report of the Volyn Local Lore Museum, we read: “The section ‘Great Patriotic War’ presents materials that tell about the actions of the Soviet Army and the partisan movement. The section shows the partisan struggle in Volyn, led by Major General Fedorov, a twice-Hero of the Soviet Union. The showcase contains Bolshevik press from behind enemy lines and press printed in the Begma unit, with a printing press standing nearby... This period ends with materials placed in the showcase: here are the memories of Volhynian partisans after the Great Patriotic War, speeches by the population at a regional meeting after the liberation of the region, signatures collected in one of the districts of the region ‘Under the word of the Great Stalin from the Ukrainian people’” (TsDAVOVU, f. 4762, inv. 1, file 559, p. 42). In addition, during the celebration of May 9 or the anniversaries of the “liberation from German fascists,” museums organised special exhibitions, and enterprises and educational institutions were obliged to organise visits to them.

There are several specialised museums dedicated to the “Great Patriotic War” in the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia, including the Military History Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Donetsk and the Young Guard Museum in Sorokino (Krasnodon). Although these institutions were established prior to the Russian occupation, they currently play a leading role in spreading Russian propaganda. In addition, annual exhibitions dedicated to the events of the “Great Patriotic War” are organised in occupied local history and art museums. The museum and exhibition displays demonstrate the connection between the events of the “Great Patriotic War” and the current Russian-Ukrainian war, the primary narrative of which is the fight against Nazism. By “denazifying” Ukraine during the so-called “SVO,” the Russians are ostensibly continuing the “feats of their ancestors” from the time of the “Great Patriotic War.” Furthermore, in accordance with the Russian Concept of Patriotic Education of 2015, it has become common practice to open School Museums of Victory, including in the occupied territories (Vorobiova, 2025).

A distinct form of museum propaganda is the so-called “SVO museums,” which began to be created in 2022. The first of these appeared in Horlivka, ostensibly opened on the initiative of the mothers of fallen soldiers (Nesterova, 2025). It is common practice to open such “museums” in educational institutions to promote anti-Ukrainian narratives, glorify war participants, and instil patriotism in pupils and students. According to historian Yevhen Shatilov, this practice was borrowed from the Soviet Union, at a time when the cult of victory in the “Great Patriotic War” was being consolidated in the 1960s–1970s (Badiuk & Shchetina, 2024).

Cultivating the image of a hero, a central pillar of political myth, is a common propaganda practice. Historical narratives shape the image of a “saviour” and “liberator” who defeats evil, and sites of memory reinforce this image in space. The creation of such historical-propagandistic museums also occurred in the Soviet Union’s annexed territories, including Southern Bessarabia. Unlike the Western Ukrainian lands, this region was multi-ethnic, with no single ethnic group predominating. Drawing on historical ties with the Russian Empire, the Stalinist regime fostered a cult of Alexander Suvorov, who stormed the Turkish fortress of Izmail in 1790. Although this territory remained under Ottoman control, Soviet propaganda portrayed Suvorov as a “liberator” from Turkish yoke, omitting the heavy casualties among the civilian population during the assault.

A year after the return of Soviet power to Izmail in 1944, a monument to the Russian commander was erected in the city. On November 7, 1947, when the entire Soviet Union was celebrating the 30th anniversary of the October Revolution, the Suvorov Regional History Museum was solemnly opened in the city. During its first six months of operation, the museum presented an exhibition comprising 14 sections dedicated to Suvorov’s biography and military career. The museum’s primary task was to disseminate narratives of Russian military glory and cultivate the cult of Suvorov’s memory. Exhibits for the museum were provided by the Hermitage, the State Russian Museum, the Artillery Historical Museum of the Red Army, the Maritime Museum, the State Ethnographic Museum in Leningrad, the State Historical Museum in Moscow, the Odessa Archaeological Museum and many others, as well as libraries, theatres, etc. Writers, sculptors, artists, and scientists from various cities, as well as the local population, participated in the collection of exhibits. By the end of 1947, the museum had collected 1,989 exhibits (Drozdov, 2022, pp. 53–54). In general, in addition to highlighting Suvorov’s activities, the museum’s narratives constructed a mythical idea of the connection between the heroic glory of the Russian army during the storming of the fortress of Izmail and the Soviet troops, as its successors, during the “liberation” of the Izmail region in 1940 and 1944.

The construction of Russian museums in the occupied territories also serves to glorify various historical figures. However, in Mariupol, the occupying authorities created a museum in honour of Andrii Zhdanov, a Soviet politician from the Stalinist era, known for organising repressions and ideological campaigns in the postwar period. Although he was born in Mariupol, his life path did not intersect with the city’s history. However, after he died in 1948, the city of Mariupol was renamed in his honour and did not regain its historical name until 1989. During the Soviet era, there was a museum dedicated to Andriy Zhdanov. However, after the restoration of Ukrainian independence, it ceased to function and was replaced by the Museum of Folk Life. Recently, after plundering the Ukrainian museum’s collections, the occupying authorities have reopened the Zhdanov Museum on its premises (“Nazad u mynule,” 2025). Moreover, according to Russian officials, the museum was opened on Putin’s direct orders and was timed to coincide with the 80th anniversary of victory in the “Great Patriotic War.” This example illustrates the Putin regime’s intent to restore the Soviet model of memorialisation, demonstrating continuity between the two regimes.

The museum-building practices of the Stalinist and Putinist regimes demonstrate considerable continuity in their instrumentalisation of the past, including in museum policy. In both cases, museum institutions are employed as resources for propaganda aimed at displacing Ukrainian national narratives and shaping an official interpretation of the past. Museums consistently promote the myths of the “Great Patriotic War” and the “liberation” of territories from the “Nazis,” popularise imperial and Soviet historical-propagandistic constructs, and cultivate images of pseudo-heroes that aligned with the political objectives of the regimes. At the same time, specific differences exist in the museum-building practices of the two dictatorships. Unlike the late Stalinist period, when museum activities were carried out amid postwar economic hardship, the modern Russian occupation authorities are investing significant resources in creating extensive multimedia historical-propagandistic complexes designed to shape a “new historical reality” in the occupied territories. Furthermore, Putin’s model seeks to erase Ukrainian cultural memory, displace it from the public sphere and replace it with the Russian imperial narrative. Another new feature is the glorification of participants in the so-called “special military operation” and the active use of cultural and educational institutions to legitimise military aggression. The creation of “SVO museums” and the installation of propaganda exhibitions in educational institutions reproduce Soviet approaches, but with more centralised control over content and more extensive efforts to involve young people in the official culture of war.

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Fig. 1. Lenin monument and the background of the Lenin museum in Lviv, mid-1950s. Source: https://photo-lviv.in.ua/budynok-na-prospekti-svobody-mytropolyt-ne-daruvav/ 

Fig. 2. Exhibition at the Lviv branch of the Central Museum of V.I. Lenin, 1953. Source: Film Magazine “Soviet Ukraine,” 1953, No. 5, krkinokhronika.

Fig. 3. Opening of the “SVO Heroes” museum in a seized school in Zaliznyi Port, Kherson region. Source: https://skadovsk.rayon.in.ua/news/681723-v-zakhopleniy-shkoli-zaliznogo-portu-rosiyski-okupanti-vidkrili-muzey-geroiv-svo 

Fig. 4. Excursion at the Suvorov Regional History Museum, 1950. Source: Film Magazine “Soviet Ukraine,” 1950, No. 25, Ukrkinokhronika.

Fig. 5. Exhibition at the Andrei Zhdanov Museum in Mariupol. Source: https://vchasnoua.com/news/nazad-u-minule-rosiiani-v-mariupoli-vidkrili-muzei-radianskogo-ideologa-zdanova